Our study seeks to investigate changes in the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures following the introduction of the New Zealand continuous disclosure reform. We further extend to study whether these changes are different when there exist the alternative sources of earnings-related information. Using the sample of 580 earnings forecasts and 626 earnings announcements released by 94 firms listed on the New Zealand Exchange during the financial reporting periods ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005, we find evidence that the introduction of the disclosure reform has impacted to the market reaction to earningsrelated disclosures and the availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information plays an important role in shaping this impact. Specifically, the market places less emphasis on post-disclosure reform management earnings forecasts issued by firms of which the alternative sources of earnings-related information are available. There is a significant reduction in the market reaction to earnings announcements in the post-disclosure reform period. This reduction is mainly driven by group of earnings announcements issued by firms of which the alternative sources of earnings-related information are not available. These findings suggest that while the enhancement of disclosure regulation in New Zealand is considered to have some positive impact on the financial environment which is consistent with regulatory intent, the regulators should be aware that the benefits from this disclosure regulation may not be universal and thus the increase in compliance costs borne by all firms could not accordingly be equally justified.
Introduction
New Zealand has introduced statutory backing for the New Zealand Exchange's (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules from 1 December 2002, which requires listed firms to disclose material information to the capital market as soon as they arise in order to promote the efficiency and integrity of the capital market (Securities Markets Amendment Act, 2002) .
Early work on this disclosure reform by Poskitt and Yang (2006) , Frijns et al. (2008 ), Huang et al. (2009 and Dunstan et al. (2010) collectively identifies a range of impacts of the disclosure reform including changes in capital market characteristics and corporate disclosure behaviour. The dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts, the market reaction to earnings announcements and the information component of the bid-ask spread for less liquid stocks all decreased following the enforcement of the disclosure reform (Frijns et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2009 ). According to Huang et al. (2009) , firms increased the number of price-sensitive disclosures released to the market and improved the timeliness of their earnings announcements. Focusing on management earnings forecasts, Dunstan et al. (2010) provide strong evidence that there have been significant changes in the likelihood, frequency and qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts in the post-disclosure reform period. Specifically, there has been an increase in the likelihood that firms issue an earnings forecast (overall and non-routine), the frequency of earnings forecasts issued by firms (overall and non-routine), and precision and the accuracy of earnings forecasts.
However, despite the broad scope adopted in Poskitt and Yang (2006) , Frijns et al. (2008) and Huang et al. (2009) , none of these studies investigate the role of alternative sources of earnings-related information and the importance of management earnings forecasts while examining the disclosure reform's impact on general capital market characteristics. Also, although Dunstan et al. (2010) find significant changes in management earnings forecast behaviour across the disclosure reform, their study has not yet provided any evidence documenting whether these incremental changes have had any impact on the general capital market characteristics. Collectively, while these findings have provided some evidence about the positive impact of the disclosure reform on capital market characteristics and corporate disclosure behaviour, we are still not in the position to fully understand how the disclosure reform interacting with the alternative sources of earnings-related information has changed corporate disclosure behaviour in general and management earnings forecast behaviour in particular, which, in turn, has impacted on the market reaction of earnings-related disclosures issued by firms and the overall information environment.
Our study seeks to investigate the impact of this disclosure reform on the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures issued by firms. We further investigate whether any impact of this disclosure reform on the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures is influenced by the availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information. New Zealand provides an ideal experimental setting to explore the impact of a possible substitution between firmbased earnings-related disclosures and those earnings-related disclosures acquired from the alternative sources because of the relatively low number of NZX-listed firms being followed by active analysts and/or cross-listed in a foreign exchange (Dunstan et al., 2010) . Our study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, unlike the broad scope adopted by the three prior studies on capital market characteristics, we focus specifically on the changes in the market reaction to the main earnings-related disclosures issued by firms (i.e. management earnings forecasts and earnings announcements) across the disclosure reform. We present a detailed empirical analysis of these changes while considering the important role of alternative sources of earnings-related information. Second, we add to the prior research which analyses the market reaction to earnings announcements by controlling for the presence of management earnings forecasts and their accuracy.
We examine the changes in the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures (i.e. management earnings forecasts and earnings announcements) following the introduction of the disclosure reform, using a sample of 580 management earnings forecasts and 626 earnings announcements provided by 94 NZX-listed firms during the 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005 financial reporting periods. In our analysis, we investigate whether the availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information (i.e. analyst coverage and media attention as proxied by cross-listing status on a foreign exchange) has had any impact on these changes.
Our results show that the introduction of the disclosure reform has impacted on the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures and the availability of alternative sources of earningsrelated information plays an important role in shaping this impact. Controlling for time-series dependency and firm-specific characteristics, we provide some evidence of a smaller market reaction around management earnings forecasts and earnings announcements after the enforcement of the disclosure reform. Specifically, the market reacts less to management earnings forecasts issued by firms which are followed by analysts and/or cross-listed on a foreign exchange following the introduction of the disclosure reform. To some extent, these findings suggest that the information content of a post-disclosure reform incremental management earnings forecast decreased when there exist alternative sources of earningsrelated information. There is a significant reduction in the market reaction to earnings announcements in the post-disclosure reform period. This reduction is mainly driven by the group of firms which are not followed by analysts and/or cross-listed on a foreign exchange.
These findings suggest that the positive impact of the disclosure reform in New Zealand on the overall information environment just before the release of earnings announcements has been restricted to firms which are not followed by analysts and/or not cross-listed on a foreign exchange. In other words, the relative benefits of the enforcement of this disclosure reform seem to be less where the alternative sources of earnings-related information are available in the capital market.
The remainder of our study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background to the continuous disclosure reform in New Zealand. Section 3 develops the research hypotheses.
Section 4 presents details about control variables. Section 5 describes the research design.
Section 6 presents the results and our study concludes in section 7.
Background to the New Zealand Continuous Disclosure Reform
Prior to 1 December 2002, New Zealand securities law only required firms to provide periodic disclosures (the filing of annual reports), episodic disclosures (e.g. the disclosure of share dealings by directors), and IPO-related disclosures (Erlenwein, 2003) . Listed firms were only bound by continuous disclosure obligations under the NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1. Under this rule, listed firms had a general obligation to disclose all price-sensitive information (relevant information) once the maintenance of confidentiality ceased to have a greater value to the issuer concerned than to the public. Like most stock exchanges' requirements, the NZX listing rules are purely contractual provisions that firms accept upon listing. Like other listing rules, the NZX had responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with Rule 10.1.1.
The purely contractual nature of the disclosure obligation led to concerns about the effectiveness of Rule 10.1.1. Specifically, the NZX's enforcement mechanisms were considered inadequate, the definition of relevant information was vague, uncertain and broad, and the rules were inconsistent with international standards (Erlenwein, 2003) .
The continuous disclosure reform came into force on 1 December 2002 under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002. It was based on the principle that a strong (statutory-backed) continuous disclosure regime would deliver superior outcomes to a rules-based model and as a result, avoid the necessity for costly quarterly reporting.
1 The amended Act does not prescribe the continuous disclosure requirements applying to listed firms; rather, it provides a statutory framework under which the NZX Listing Rule 10.1 operates. The amended Act requires a listed firm to make any material information about events or matters available to participants in the registered exchange's market as they arise (the amended Act, Section 19D).
Thus, the amended Act preserves the autonomy of the NZX through recognising its primary responsibility for monitoring its own listing rules. It has also provided an enforcement regime to be implemented by either the Securities Commission, with its persecutory role, or any other person with an interest in any failure to disclose. The amended Act emphasises investor protection through an informed market -a market in which "material information" must be released on a timely basis. According to Section 19E, material information is defined as information that: Coinciding with the introduction of the amended Act, on 1 December 2002, the NZX introduced revised Listing Rule 10.1 to ensure compatibility with the amended Act. The revised rule provides that a listed firm should release material information immediately once becoming "aware" of it. A listed issuer is deemed to have come into possession of material information once a director or executive officer has become aware of it in the course of the performance of his or her duties (Listing Rule 10.1.1). The NZX has recognised that there are situations where the issuer should legally be allowed to withhold material information.
Although not incorporated into the amended Act, the "carve-out" provisions are a vital part of the disclosure reform. According to the provisions, material information does not have to be released when: (1) a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed; and (2) the information is confidential and its confidentiality is maintained; and (3) it would either be illegal to release the information, or it contains an incomplete proposal or negotiation, or comprises matters or supposition, or is insufficiently definite, or is for internal management only, or is a trade secret. Even if all three criteria are met, a firm can still be required to release specific information if it is necessary to prevent the development of a false market in a firm's securities.
2
If an issuer is found to have breached the continuous disclosure provisions, the Securities Commission has the power under the amended Act to issue an order requiring the issuer to disclose the necessary information and to publish corrective statements at the firm's expense.
If the issuer commits a criminal offence in contravention of an order, a fine of up to $30,000
can be imposed. The Court may also make civil orders requiring disclosure or corrective statements, imposing pecuniary penalties of up to $300,000, make compensatory orders, and order the payment of the Securities Commission's costs and expenses.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
In a capital market economy, information and agency problems hamper the efficient allocation of resources. Among several potential solutions to mitigate these problems are regulations which require the full disclosure of all firms' private information and the demand for analysts who engage in uncovering private information about firms and for the media who packages and disseminates information as well as creates new information (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001; Bushee et al., 2009) . Given the information and agency problems, managers balance conflicting interests in deciding the optimal level of disclosure for their firms which may not necessarily be the full disclosure option (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986) .
In the absence of mandatory disclosure regulation, the decision to voluntarily disclose information is strategically driven and influenced by the nature of the information held by managers, incentives of managers, circumstances of the firms and expected reaction by investors, analysts and media to the disclosures.
Intervention in the form of mandatory disclosure regulation introduces compliance costs and leads managers to reassess their disclosure strategies, realigning the optimal level of voluntary disclosure with the level of mandatory disclosure for their firms. From the analysts' perspective, this regulatory intervention could potentially change the optimal level of information uncovered by analysts. If the optimal level of firms' voluntary disclosure together with firms' level of mandatory disclosure potentially enables analysts to improve their information production process, the demand for analysts could increase and the optimal level of information uncovered by analysts could accordingly increase. Alternatively, if the firms'
voluntary and mandatory disclosure pre-empts analysts' information, information to be issued by analysts would be less valuable. Accordingly, the demand for analysts and their optimal of information supplied would decrease. From the media's perspective, this regulation intervention could also alter the optimal level of information packaged, disseminated and created by the media. Similar to the impact of this regulation intervention on the role of analysts, the role of media may be more or less valuable.
From the investors' perspective, the regulatory intervention could also alter the way investors acquire and interpret the information about firms. Investors may find it less costly for them to acquire information directly from the firms and rely less on information provided by the analysts and/or the media. However, investors may be confused by a flood of information, much of which may not be value relevant to them and rely more on the analysts' and the media's information. Therefore, it is important from a regulatory perspective to understand under what circumstances a mandatory disclosure regulation is effective in providing a desirable level of information in order to correct market expectations of the firm's earnings performance and improve the efficiency and integrity of the capital market.
In the absence of a mandatory requirement for managers to forecast their firms' earnings, management earnings forecasts are important voluntary disclosures providing information about expected earnings of a firm. Managers may release earnings forecasts to correct what they perceive as an inaccurate market expectation of earnings and consequently influence their firms' stock price (Nagar et al., 2003; Hirst et al., 2008) . Prior U.S. studies seek to examine whether management earnings forecasts, over which managers have considerable discretion about the timing, frequency, precision and accuracy, carry information content relevant to the capital market. In fact, there is strong evidence that management earnings forecasts are influential on share prices (Patell, 1976; Penman, 1980; Pownall et al., 1993) , analyst behaviour (Baginski and Hassell, 1990 ) and the information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 1997) .
This prior research has not compared the relative informativeness of unregulated and regulated management earnings forecasts. The disclosure reform in New Zealand, which requires that all price-sensitive information be disclosed immediately to the NZX, provides the opportunity to examine whether the disclosure reform has altered investors' perception of management earnings forecasts. If the disclosure reform is effective in prompting managers to make timelier and more informative earnings-related announcements, we would expect the information surprise associated with each incremental management earnings forecast to be lower in the post-disclosure reform period. If this is the case, the magnitude of the market reaction to each individual management earnings forecast will decrease in the post-disclosure reform period if the regulation has been effective. Interestingly, if the disclosure reform is effective in penalising misleading management earnings forecasts, the credibility of management earnings forecasts issued in the post-disclosure reform period could be enhanced, leading to a greater market reaction. However, the effectiveness of this disclosure reform has been challenged due to the lack of strong enforcement and the difficulty in compliance (Dunstan et al., 2010) . The disclosure reform may not be coercive enough to force managers to reassess their disclosure strategies. If this is the case, there will be no change in the magnitude of the market reaction to each individual management earnings forecast. Given the ambiguity about how the disclosure reform impacts on management earnings forecast behaviour and the market perception of those earnings forecasts, we state our hypothesis regarding the magnitude of market reaction management earnings forecasts in the null form.
H1: There is no change in the market reaction to management earnings forecasts
in the post-disclosure reform period.
According to Huang et al. (2009) and Dunstan et al. (2010) , firms increased the number of price-sensitive disclosures in general, and management earnings forecasts in particular, to the capital market after the enforcement of this disclosure reform. However, we have not learnt from these studies whether the disclosure reform has altered the overall information set available to the capital market.
The disclosure reform may result in changes in the way in which the capital market becomes informed. If the firm becomes a greater information supplier following the disclosure reform, we would expect that there would be less return available for the analysts and the media from their information production. In other words, if the disclosure reform has impacted on the supply of alternative information and created substitution effects then the overall information set available to the capital market will not be altered. If however, the disclosure reform has lead to more disclosures but not necessarily better disclosures which may be of little value to the analysts, the media and the investors, thus reducing the overall information set available to the capital market (Gaynor, 2003) . If alternatively, the disclosure reform has resulted in the disclosure of extra commentary which makes it easier for the analysts and the media to uncover information about firms; we might expect the overall information set to be increased in the post-disclosure reform.
Earnings announcements provide significant information about firms' earnings performance and are found to influence stock prices (Beaver, 1968) . However, prior studies show that most of the information provided by earnings announcements has been incorporated into stock prices via earnings-related pre-announcements (Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver et al., 1980; Freeman, 1987) . The magnitude of market reaction to earnings announcements will depend on how much of the underlying information has already been pre-empted. In other words, the magnitude of market reaction to earnings announcement will depend on the overall information set available to the capital market before the release of earnings announcements.
An introduction of a disclosure reform will have an impact on the way in which the market reacts to earnings announcements if such disclosure reform has an impact on the overall information set immediately before the release of earnings announcements. Due to the strength of the opposing views regarding the likely impact of the disclosure reform on the overall information set, we state our hypothesis regarding the impact of the disclosure reform on the magnitude of market reaction to earnings announcements in the null form.
H2: There is no change in the market reaction to earnings announcements in the post-disclosure reform period.
Control Variables

Analyst Following
Prior research provides evidence that analysts and investors rely on firms' disclosures, including management earnings forecasts, as a guidance to improve their information production process and tend to provide coverage for and invest in firms providing more disclosures in general and more earnings forecasts in particular (Hirst et al., 2008) . The New Zealand environment is characterised by a very low level of analyst following. 3 When firms are followed by analysts, the way that investors acquire and interpret firms' information might depend on how they perceive the information provided directly from firms compared to the information provided by analysts. If investors are comfortable with disclosures issued by firms, they might rely less on analysts' information and thus reacting more strongly to firms' disclosures. However, if investors find disclosures issued by firms not relevant or difficult to interpret, they might rely more on analysts' information and thus reacting less strongly to firms' disclosures. Therefore, it is important to control for analyst following.
Cross-listing Status
According to Baker et al. (2002) , firms cross-listed on a foreign exchange experienced a significant increase in their visibility in the capital market by getting more attention from both analysts and media. Also, firms cross-listed on other foreign exchange could be subjected to more onerous disclosure rules which existed prior to the disclosure reform. 4 These more onerous disclosure rules and their associated litigation risk for non-compliance are likely to lead to fewer ad-hoc and low quality disclosures for those firms. Such an expectation is consistent with the findings of Dunstan et al. (2010) who find that cross-listed firms did not significantly change their disclosure strategies in the post-disclosure reform period. We, therefore, include cross-listing status as a control.
Forecast-specific Characteristics
Most prior studies of the market reaction to management earnings forecasts consistently document a greater market reaction to bad news than for good news management earnings forecasts. Investor reaction to management earnings forecasts varies depending on the confidence in which they have in the quality of the information disclosed. This is driven in part by the expectations that investors have about the disclosure motives of firms and their assessment of the quality of the information disclosed (Skinner, 1994; Soffer et al., 2000) .
Therefore, we seek to control for the nature of the earnings news.
Management may release earnings forecasts as part of a routine event such as the chairman's address at the annual general meeting or concurrently with the release of mandatory reports.
Management may also update the market through the release of a non-routine announcement at any time. To some extent, the market would only expect to make non-routine earnings forecasts where the benefits of the disclosure are high, thus reacting more strongly to the nonroutine disclosures. Thus, it is important to control for the non-routine nature of the earnings forecasts.
Prior studies also document the impact of other forecast-specific characteristics on the market reaction to management earnings forecasts. Baginski et al. (1993) reveal that the market reacts more to forecasts with higher levels of precision (i.e. point forecasts carry more information content compared to other less precise ones). However, Pownall et al. (1993) and Atiase et al. (2005) find that the forecast precision has no impact on the forecasts' information content. In respect of forecast horizon, Pownall et al. (1993) and Ng et al. (2008) confirm that earnings forecasts with shorter horizons are of higher quality and more relevant to the capital market.
In respect of prior forecast accuracy, Hutton and Stocken (2009) find that the market reacts more promptly to both good news and bad news earnings forecasts released by firms with a strong reputation for providing accurate forecasts. Given these prior research findings, we expect that these qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts in terms of forecast precision, forecast horizon and prior forecast accuracy would impact on the market reaction; thus, these three forecast-specific characteristics are controlled in the testing procedure.
Firm-specific Characteristics
There are also numerous firm-specific factors that are likely to influence the market reaction to earnings-related announcements. Prior research has shown that firm-specific attributes such as firm performance, firm size and growth opportunities impact the disclosure decision and market interpretation of this decision (Atiase et al., 1988; Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) . We, therefore, include these controls in all of our models.
Research Design
Study Period and Sample
The focus of our study is to examine the impact of the New Zealand disclosure reform on market reaction to earnings-related disclosures. Our data starts with financial reporting period ending on 31 January 1999, the earliest date for which reliable disclosure data is available, and extends to the financial reporting period ending on 31 December 2005. 5 This gives us roughly an eight-year testing period. Our focus is on the population of all NZX-listed firms that survived at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 2004. The total sample meets this criterion is 94 firms that issued 2650 usable announcements containing current or prospective information about earnings over the study period. 720 of these announcements contain usable earnings forecasts, among which 580 are bad or good news earnings forecasts. 6 Our second sample of focus contains a total of 626 usable earnings announcements during the same time period. Details of the sample selection procedure are provided in Table 1 .
Data Sources
The cross-listing status and listing data information are taken directly from the NZX helpline service. Earnings and other accounting variables, market capitalisation and market-based data are obtained from either the IRG or the Datastream database. All disclosure data are obtained from the IRG database.
Identification and Coding of Management Earnings Forecasts
All announcements made over the study period are coded accordingly to the underlying (routine or non-routine) events associated with the announcements. Routine event announcements are defined as periodic announcements common to all firms required under the NZX listing rules or are in common practice. They include announcements containing mandatory period reports (quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary and annual reports) and other periodic releases associated with repetitive events, including the chairman's address at the annual general meeting, letters to shareholders, and other regular periodic financial updates. impression about the expected performance (e.g. "we expect improved earnings performance this year"). These qualitative forecasts do not capture any precise numeric interpretation about the firms' expected performance. Open-ended forecasts are forecasts where management specifies a lower bound or an upper bound for the expected firm performance (e.g. "profit will be greater than $5 million" or "profit will be lower than $2 million"). Range forecasts contain a precise numeric range of expected firm performance (e.g. "profit will be between $1.1 and $1.3 million"). Point forecasts are the most specific, indicating a precise single numerical figure about expected performance (e.g. "net income will be $1.2 million").
Forecast horizon captures the timeliness of the earnings forecasts. Assuming forecasts are accurate, longer forecast horizon provides investors with information on a timelier basis.
Baginski et al. (2002) define forecast horizon as the number of calendar days until period end, regardless of whether the period is an interim or annual forecasting period. We follow the similar procedure and based on the facts that most forecasts in New Zealand relate to current full period earnings, we measure forecast horizon as the number of calendar days between the release date of the earnings forecast and the end of the current financial year.
We follow Hutton and Stocken (2009) in suggesting that prior year's forecast accuracy would enhance the credibility of the current year's earnings forecasts.
Market Reaction to Management Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Announcements
Cumulative abnormal returns around the release date of the earnings forecasts and earnings announcements are used as the measurement of the market reaction to these announcements.
The abnormal return for each day of the event window is measured using the single factor market model with the NZX Top40&50 Index.
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Prior research reveals inconsistency in the length of event window for cumulative abnormal return measurement. Shorter windows fail to fully capture the effects of analyst briefings preand post-announcements, occasional NZX misspecification of announcement dates and delayed reaction to announcements due to the subsequent press coverage or firm press release.
However, wider event windows create the risk of capturing other event effects, such as the weekend effect, that are not related to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. Skinner (1994) uses the [0,1] model while Kasznik and Lev (1995) use several different event windows including the five day windows. We propose the use of five day window to capture the market reaction to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. 
Hypothesis Testing Procedures
Our hypotheses are tested using univariate methods and due to the expected interactions across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test hypotheses and to control for common firm-specific characteristics expected to impact on the market reaction to earnings forecasts and earnings announcements. Depending on the results of Breusch and
Pagan Lagrangian and Hausman test, we employ the random effects, fixed effects or OLS linear regression models where appropriate to make the inferences about the hypothesised relationships and to control for forecast-specific and firms-specific characteristics. The generic models are depicted as follows. Models 1 and 2a-b are used to test the changes in the market reaction to earnings forecasts (H1) and earnings announcements (H2) following the disclosure reform, respectively. The definitions of the dependent variables are as follows.
CAR is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the management earnings forecasts.
EACAR is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the earnings announcements.
REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform period or 0 otherwise.
ENEWS is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise.
NREVENT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast is released through a nonroutine announcement and 0 otherwise.
PRECISE is level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively.
FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of earnings forecast and the corresponding financial reporting date.
PRIOR_INACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the last management earnings forecast in the previous financial year is inaccurate and 0 if either the last management earnings forecast is accurate or no management earnings forecast is made.
ECSIGN is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise.
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year.
XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise.
MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year.
ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise.
PRE-EMPT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's change in earnings is
pre-empted by at least on management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise.
ACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by accurate management earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise. Table 2 displays the abnormal returns for the five days encompassing 580 bad news or good news management earnings forecasts made by 94 firms during the study period. Consistent with prior research, we find that the capital market typically responds negatively to bad news and positively to good news and that there is an asymmetrical reaction to bad and good news.
Results
Market Reaction to Earnings Forecasts
The mean of cumulative five day abnormal returns for bad news is -5.132 percent compared to 1.259 percent for good news earnings forecasts. This asymmetrical treatment of bad news and good news still prevailed across the disclosure reform. Although an overall comparison between the cumulative five day abnormal returns for routine and non-routine earnings forecasts do not reveal any significant difference, the capital market reacted negatively to non-routine earnings forecasts in the pre-disclosure reform period. Overall, the capital market reacted positively to earnings forecasts issued by firms not followed by analysts or by firms not cross-listed and negatively to earnings forecasts issued by firms followed by analysts or by firms cross-listed. Such difference does not seem to be alleviated following the disclosure reform. Table 3 compares the magnitude of the cumulative five day abnormal returns associated with these 580 earnings forecasts across the disclosure reform. Overall, the capital market reacted more strongly to bad news earnings forecasts compared to good news earnings forecasts and this asymmetrical treatment tended to decrease in the post-disclosure reform period.
Interestingly, non-routine earnings forecasts consistently proved to have more value relevant to the capital market across the disclosure reform. The capital market reacted less strongly to firms that are followed by analysts or cross-listed. This trend is more obvious in the postdisclosure reform period. shown. The REFORM coefficient is not significant; therefore, H1 is supported for the overall sample of 580 bad or good news earnings forecasts. The REFORM_NREVENT, REFORM_ANALYST, REFORM_XLIST are negatively significant. Therefore, H1 is rejected by the group of non-routine earnings forecasts or by the group of earnings forecasts issued by firms followed by analysts or cross-listed on a foreign exchange. Further evidence from Table   7 reveals significant coefficients for some forecast-specific and firm-specific characteristics.
The ENEWS coefficient is negatively significant, indicating that the capital market overall reacted more strongly to bad news earnings forecasts. The positive significant NREVENT coefficient shows that non-routine earnings forecasts are more value relevant to the capital market. It is evident from the significant negative PRIOR_ACCURACY coefficient that prior years' forecast accuracy did enhance the credibility of current years' earnings forecasts. The SIZE coefficient is negatively significant shows that the information content of an incremental management earnings issued by bigger firms is lower than their smaller counterparts. The positive significant XLIST coefficient indicates the earnings forecasts provided by cross-listed firms being more value relevant. Table 4 shows the abnormal return for the five days encompassing 626 earnings announcements in general and 350 pre-empted earnings announcements in particular provided by the same 94 firms during the same study period. Overall, the capital market reacted negatively to earnings announcements indicating a negative change in earnings performance, or to earnings announcements issued by firms not followed by analysts or by firms issuing inaccurate earnings forecasts. Table 5 compares the magnitude of the cumulative five day abnormal returns associated with these 626 earnings announcements in general and 350 pre-empted earnings announcements in particular. Our results document a significant reduction in the market reaction to the overall earnings announcements, irrespectively whether they are pre-empted by management earnings forecasts. The magnitude of the market reaction to earnings announcements significantly reduced from 0.058 to 0.043 at 1 percent level of significance. These findings are mainly driven by the group of earnings announcements indicating a positive change in earnings performance, or by the group of earnings announcements issued by firms which are not followed by analysts or not cross-listed on a foreign exchange or provide accurate earnings forecasts. Table 8 and 9, the REFORM coefficient is negatively significant; therefore H2 is rejected. From Table 8 , the negative significant REFORM_ECSIGN coefficient and the positive significant REFORM_ANALYST and REFORM_PRE-EMPT coefficients reveal that, H2 is only rejected by the group of earnings announcements indicating a positive change in earnings performance or by the group of earnings announcements issued by firms which are not followed by analysts or not crosslisted on a foreign exchange. From Table 9 , the REFORM_ACCURACY is marginally negative significant, confirming that H2 is marginally rejected by the group of earnings announcements pre-empted by accurate earnings forecasts.
Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements
Conclusions
The objective of our study has been (1) to investigate the impact of the New Zealand continuous disclosure reform on the market reaction to earnings-related disclosures issued by firms and (2) to examine whether any impact of this disclosure reform is influenced by the availability of alternative sources of earnings-related information. Focusing first on management earnings forecasts, we find only limited evidence of changes that can be linked to the disclosure reform. However, there is evidence in the post-disclosure reform period that the capital market has placed less emphasis on management earnings forecasts issued by firms which are followed by analysts and/or cross-listed on a foreign exchange. These findings suggest that the incremental value of each management earnings forecast perceived by investors decreased in the post-disclosure reform period when investors could seek information about firms independently from the alternative sources. This is not the case when there is a less likelihood of an availability of an alternative source of information.
Stronger evidence for an impact of the disclosure reform is found in our analysis of the market reaction to earnings announcements. The market reaction to earnings announcements if found to significantly decrease in the post-disclosure reform period, indicating a significant improvement in the information set available to the capital market immediately before the release of these mandatory earnings announcements. Interestingly, while we have found the reform has diminished the value relevance of earnings announcements, this impact is only restricted to firms which are not followed by analysts and/or not cross-listed in a foreign exchange. In other words, the relative benefits of this disclosure reform seem to be less when there are alternative sources of earnings-related information available in the capital market.
From an academic perspective, our evidence adds to the current literature body that supports a positive impact of the disclosure reform on corporate disclosure behaviour and capital market characteristics. However, by investigating the availability of alternative sources of earnings related information about firms, we have given a clearer picture of the relative information changes for different firms.
From a regulatory perspective, our evidence could be consistent with the regulators' intent that the disclosure reform has improved the flow of information available in the capital market. However, the fact that there is not a positive impact for many firms means that the regulators should be aware that the disclosure reform may not bear benefits universally. This means that the increase in compliance costs which are borne by all firms could not be justified equally based on the benefits. This table shows the results of the one-sample student t-statistic for the abnormal returns for the five days encompassing 580 bad and good news management earnings forecasts. A management earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current financial year's earnings announcement. A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. A management earnings forecast is classified as bad (good) news if the forecast indicates an expected negative (positive) change in the current year earnings. A management earnings forecast is classified as routine (non-routine) if the forecast is released through a routine announcement such as quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary annual, annual reports, chairman's addresses at AGM, letters to shareholders, etc. (non-routine announcement such as profit warning, earnings guidance, market update, etc). A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the cross-listed period if its corresponding firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in its corresponding financial year. -2.066* -0.122 -2.606* ^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed).
1 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for the pre-disclosure reform and postdisclosure reform period management earnings forecasts.
2 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for bad and good news management earnings forecasts.
3 Showing the t-statistic and zstatistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for routine and non-routine management earnings forecasts.
4 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for management earnings forecasts released in financial years not followed and followed by analysts.
5 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for management earnings forecasts released in financial years not cross-listed and cross-listed. The table is based on 580 bad and good news management earnings forecasts made by 94 NZX-listed firms with financial reporting date ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. A management earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current financial year's earnings announcement. A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. A management earnings forecast is classified as bad (good) news if the forecast indicates an expected negative (positive) change in the current year earnings. A management earnings forecast is classified as routine (non-routine) if the forecast is released through a routine announcement such as quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary annual, annual reports, chairman's addresses at AGM, letters to shareholders, etc. (non-routine announcement such as profit warning, earnings guidance, market update, etc.). A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. A management earnings forecast is classified as being in the cross-listed period if its corresponding firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in its corresponding financial year. ^, *, ** The abnormal returns are significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). This table shows the results of the one-sample student t-statistic for the abnormal returns for the five days encompassing 626 earnings announcements. An earnings announcement is a mandatory preliminary financial report made to the NZX before the release of the corresponding annual report as required by Listing Rule 10.4. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the period with negative (positive) earnings change if it shows a decrease (an increase) in earnings per share. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted (not pre-empted) if it is pre-empted (not pre-empted) by at least one management earnings forecast. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted by inaccurate (accurate) management earnings forecasts if the corresponding last management earnings forecast is inaccurate (accurate). An earnings announcement is classified as being in the cross-listed period if its corresponding firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in its corresponding financial year. 1 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in the pre-disclosure reform and post-disclosure reform periods.
2 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in the negative and positive earnings change financial years.
3 Showing the t-statistics and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in financial years not followed and followed by analysts. 4 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in financial years not pre-empted and pre-empted by management earnings forecasts.
5 Showing the t-statistic and z-statistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in firms years with inaccurate and accurate management earnings forecasts.
6 Showing the t-statistic and zstatistic of difference between means of the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for earnings announcements released in financial years not cross-listed and cross-listed. The table is based on 626 earnings announcements made by 94 NZX-listed firms with financial reporting date ending from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. An earnings announcement is a mandatory preliminary financial report made to the NZX before the release of the corresponding annual report as required by Listing Rule 10.4. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the pre-disclosure reform (post-disclosure reform) period if its corresponding financial year ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the period with negative (positive) earnings change if it shows a decrease (an increase) in earnings per share. An earnings announcement is classified as being in the period followed by analysts if its corresponding firm is followed by at least one analyst in its corresponding financial year. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted if it is pre-empted by at least one management earnings forecast. An earnings announcement is classified as being pre-empted by inaccurate (accurate) management earnings forecasts if the corresponding last management earnings forecast is inaccurate (accurate). An earnings announcement is classified as being in the cross-listed period if its corresponding firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in its corresponding financial year. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. Total Market Value of Equity is the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year. ENEWS is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. NREVENT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if management earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. PRECISE is level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the corresponding financial year. PRIOR_INACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the last management earnings forecast in the previous financial year is inaccurate and 0 if either the last management earnings forecast is accurate or no management earnings forecast is made. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. ACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by accurate management earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise. 001 ^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Random effects and fixed effects linear regression models are used where the dependent variable is CAR, the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the management earnings forecasts. REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform period or 0 otherwise. ENEWS is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current year earnings and 0 otherwise. NREVENT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. PRECISE is level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of earnings forecast and the corresponding financial reporting date. PRIOR_INACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the last management earnings forecast in the previous financial year is inaccurate and 0 if either the last management earnings forecast is accurate or no management earnings forecast is made. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. REFORM_ENEWS is REFORM multiplied by ENEWS. REFORM_NREVENT is REFORM multiplied by NREVENT. REFORM_ANALYST is REFORM multiplied by ANALYST. REFORM_XLIST is REFORM multiplied by XLIST. 044 ^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Random effects linear regression model is used where dependent variable is EACAR, the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the earnings announcements. REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform period or 0 otherwise. ECSIGN is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is a natural logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. PRE-EMPT is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by at least on management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. REFORM_ECSIGN is REFORM multiplied by ECSIGN. REFORM_ANALYST is REFORM multiplied by ANALYST. REFORM_PRE-EMPT is REFORM multiplied by PRE-EMPT. REFORM_XLIST is REFORM multiplied by XLIST. .320* ^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Linear regression model is used where dependent variable is EACAR, the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the five day abnormal return associated with the earnings announcements. REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-disclosure reform period or 0 otherwise. ECSIGN is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is a natural logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity at the end of the current financial year. XLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial year. ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the corresponding financial year and 0 otherwise. ACCURACY is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by accurate management earnings forecasts and 0 otherwise. REFORM_ECSIGN is REFORM multiplied by ECSIGN. REFORM_ANALYST is REFORM multiplied by ANALYST. REFORM_ACCURACY is REFORM multiplied by ACCURACY. REFORM_XLIST is REFORM multiplied by XLIST.
